7
Bluescreen Fehlermeldung
Hallo miteinander. Ich habe ein Problem mit meinem Laptop. Es ist ein Dell Studio 1558. Ich arbeite unter Windows7.
Ich erhalte seit einiger zeit Bluescrren Fehlermeldungen. Diese Treten, nach meinen erkenntnissen, zufällig auf. Also nicht beim Straten eines bestimmten Programms oder Prozesses, zumindest keinem von mir gestratetem.
Ich poste unten sowohl den Minidump, als auch den Memorydump der letzten Bluescreen Fehlermeldung. Die Dumpdateien wurden über Windbg debuggt.
Zuerst den Minidump:
Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.12.0002.633 AMD64
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Loading Dump File [C:\Users\Hannes\Desktop\031511-27518-01.dmp]
Mini Kernel Dump File: Only registers and stack trace are available
Symbol search path is: srv*DownstreamStore*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is:
Windows 7 Kernel Version 7600 MP (4 procs) Free x64
Product: WinNt, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS Personal
Built by: 7600.16695.amd64fre.win7_gdr.101026-1503
Machine Name:
Kernel base = 0xfffff800`02a52000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0xfffff800`02c8fe50
Debug session time: Tue Mar 15 23:43:39.902 2011 (UTC + 1:00)
System Uptime: 0 days 3:27:24.073
Loading Kernel Symbols
Loading User Symbols
Loading unloaded module list
*
Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information.
BugCheck 7F, {8, 80050031, 6f8, fffff80002a8aeb0}
Probably caused by : ntkrnlmp.exe ( nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+b2 )
Followup: MachineOwner
3: kd> !analyze -v
*
UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP (7f)
This means a trap occurred in kernel mode, and it's a trap of a kind
that the kernel isn't allowed to have/catch (bound trap) or that
is always instant death (double fault). The first number in the
bugcheck params is the number of the trap (8 = double fault, etc)
Consult an Intel x86 family manual to learn more about what these
traps are. Here is a *portion* of those codes:
If kv shows a taskGate
use .tss on the part before the colon, then kv.
Else if kv shows a trapframe
use .trap on that value
Else
.trap on the appropriate frame will show where the trap was taken
(on x86, this will be the ebp that goes with the procedure KiTrap)
Endif
kb will then show the corrected stack.
Arguments:
Arg1: 0000000000000008, EXCEPTION_DOUBLE_FAULT
Arg2: 0000000080050031
Arg3: 00000000000006f8
Arg4: fffff80002a8aeb0
Debugging Details:
BUGCHECK_STR: 0x7f_8
CUSTOMER_CRASH_COUNT: 1
DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT
PROCESS_NAME: System
CURRENT_IRQL: 2
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from fffff80002ac1ca9 to fffff80002ac2740
STACK_TEXT:
fffff880`02bd9ce8 fffff800`02ac1ca9 : 00000000`0000007f 00000000`00000008 00000000`80050031 00000000`000006f8 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
fffff880`02bd9cf0 fffff800`02ac0172 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69
fffff880`02bd9e30 fffff800`02a8aeb0 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+0xb2
fffff880`07c46b70 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!SeAccessCheckFromState+0x58
STACK_COMMAND: kb
FOLLOWUP_IP:
nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+b2
fffff800`02ac0172 90 nop
SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 2
SYMBOL_NAME: nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+b2
FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner
MODULE_NAME: nt
IMAGE_NAME: ntkrnlmp.exe
DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 4cc791bd
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+b2
BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+b2
Followup: MachineOwner
3: kd> lmvm nt
start end module name
fffff800`02a52000 fffff800`0302f000 nt (pdb symbols) C:\ProgramData\dbg\sym\ntkrnlmp.pdb\518768F0031C4F5C9C3211628CC6C8422\ntkrnlmp.pdb
Loaded symbol image file: ntkrnlmp.exe
Mapped memory image file: C:\ProgramData\dbg\sym\ntoskrnl.exe\4CC791BD5dd000\ntoskrnl.exe
Image path: ntkrnlmp.exe
Image name: ntkrnlmp.exe
Timestamp: Wed Oct 27 04:43:09 2010 (4CC791BD)
CheckSum: 00550986
ImageSize: 005DD000
File version: 6.1.7600.16695
Product version: 6.1.7600.16695
File flags: 0 (Mask 3F)
File OS: 40004 NT Win32
File type: 1.0 App
File date: 00000000.00000000
Translations: 0409.04b0
CompanyName: Microsoft Corporation
ProductName: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
InternalName: ntkrnlmp.exe
OriginalFilename: ntkrnlmp.exe
ProductVersion: 6.1.7600.16695
FileVersion: 6.1.7600.16695 (win7_gdr.101026-1503)
FileDescription: NT Kernel & System
LegalCopyright: © Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Nun der Memorydump:
Loading Dump File [C:\Users\Hannes\Desktop\MEMORY.DMP]
Kernel Summary Dump File: Only kernel address space is available
Symbol search path is: srv*DownstreamStore*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is:
Windows 7 Kernel Version 7600 MP (4 procs) Free x64
Product: WinNt, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS Personal
Built by: 7600.16695.amd64fre.win7_gdr.101026-1503
Machine Name:
Kernel base = 0xfffff800`02a52000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0xfffff800`02c8fe50
Debug session time: Tue Mar 15 23:43:39.902 2011 (UTC + 1:00)
System Uptime: 0 days 3:27:24.073
Loading Kernel Symbols
Loading User Symbols
Loading unloaded module list
*
Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information.
BugCheck 7F, {8, 80050031, 6f8, fffff80002a8aeb0}
* ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for vsdatant.sys
* ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for NETw5s64.sys
Probably caused by : NETIO.SYS ( NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a )
Followup: MachineOwner
3: kd> !analyze -v
*
UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP (7f)
This means a trap occurred in kernel mode, and it's a trap of a kind
that the kernel isn't allowed to have/catch (bound trap) or that
is always instant death (double fault). The first number in the
bugcheck params is the number of the trap (8 = double fault, etc)
Consult an Intel x86 family manual to learn more about what these
traps are. Here is a *portion* of those codes:
If kv shows a taskGate
use .tss on the part before the colon, then kv.
Else if kv shows a trapframe
use .trap on that value
Else
.trap on the appropriate frame will show where the trap was taken
(on x86, this will be the ebp that goes with the procedure KiTrap)
Endif
kb will then show the corrected stack.
Arguments:
Arg1: 0000000000000008, EXCEPTION_DOUBLE_FAULT
Arg2: 0000000080050031
Arg3: 00000000000006f8
Arg4: fffff80002a8aeb0
Debugging Details:
BUGCHECK_STR: 0x7f_8
DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT
PROCESS_NAME: System
CURRENT_IRQL: 2
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from fffff80002ac1ca9 to fffff80002ac2740
STACK_TEXT:
fffff880`02bd9ce8 fffff800`02ac1ca9 : 00000000`0000007f 00000000`00000008 00000000`80050031 00000000`000006f8 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
fffff880`02bd9cf0 fffff800`02ac0172 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69
fffff880`02bd9e30 fffff800`02a8aeb0 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+0xb2
fffff880`07c46b70 fffff880`0158ec5a : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!SeAccessCheckFromState+0x58
fffff880`07c47260 fffff880`0158c94f : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+0x6a
fffff880`07c472d0 fffff880`0158e9b5 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : NETIO!MatchValues+0xef
fffff880`07c47320 fffff880`0158e845 : fffffa80`06d3ac30 fffffa80`04b8e9c0 fffff880`07c47548 fffff880`07c47c80 : NETIO!FilterMatch+0x95
fffff880`07c47370 fffff880`0158fccb : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff880`07c47c80 fffff880`07c47530 : NETIO!IndexListClassify+0x69
fffff880`07c473f0 fffff880`0363d417 : fffff880`07c478c8 fffff880`07c478c8 fffff880`07c48600 fffffa80`07f3e610 : NETIO!KfdClassify+0xa4e
fffff880`07c47760 fffff880`0363683e : fffff880`03745690 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`071d3db0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleClassify+0x57
fffff880`07c477a0 fffff880`03635cd5 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAlepAuthorizeSend+0x94e
fffff880`07c47eb0 fffff880`03639886 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000011 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleAuthorizeSend+0x325
fffff880`07c48180 fffff880`0363c5e4 : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`07c485b8 fffff880`07c485c0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleConnectAcceptIndicate+0x106
fffff880`07c48270 fffff880`03635019 : 00000000`0e8f5437 fffff880`03812f2b 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000008 : tcpip!ProcessALEForTransportPacket+0x664
fffff880`07c484e0 fffff880`03663ef6 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`00000002 fffffa80`047f8900 fffffa80`071c8900 : tcpip!WfpProcessOutTransportStackIndication+0x329
fffff880`07c486b0 fffff880`036691ee : fffffa80`047f6080 fffff880`0158a804 fffff880`0376b9a0 fffffa80`071d3db0 : tcpip!IppSendDatagramsCommon+0x526
fffff880`07c48980 fffff880`03633db8 : fffffa80`071d3db0 fffffa80`07f3e610 fffffa80`07f3e610 fffffa80`047f6080 : tcpip!IpNlpSendDatagrams+0x3e
fffff880`07c489c0 fffff880`0363432d : fffffa80`06e64280 fffffa80`06ea6200 fffff880`07c49310 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpSendMessagesOnPathCreation+0x688
fffff880`07c48d40 fffff880`03633fb5 : fffff880`07c49270 fffffa80`072e8900 fffff880`00000001 fffffa80`05eee080 : tcpip!UdpSendMessages+0x35d
fffff880`07c49130 fffff800`02ad1e5a : fffff880`07c494c0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpTlProviderSendMessagesCalloutRoutine+0x15
fffff880`07c49160 fffff880`03634578 : fffff880`03633fa0 fffff880`07c49270 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0xda
fffff880`07c49240 fffff880`0297ef45 : fffffa80`04e051c0 fffffa80`0427bc10 fffffa80`0409bcd0 fffffa80`070eddce : tcpip!UdpTlProviderSendMessages+0x78
fffff880`07c492c0 fffff880`0297eff2 : fffffa80`04e8d902 fffffa80`06228140 fffffa80`03ead770 fffffa80`06228140 : tdx!TdxSendDatagramTransportAddress+0x2f5
fffff880`07c493a0 fffff880`0397a542 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`03df9f20 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`03ead610 : tdx!TdxTdiDispatchInternalDeviceControl+0x52
fffff880`07c493d0 fffff880`0397af61 : fffffa80`070edd98 fffffa80`070edd98 fffffa80`0718c4e0 fffff880`07c494d0 : netbt!TdiSendDatagram+0x187
fffff880`07c49440 fffff880`03987329 : fffffa80`0402af50 fffffa80`070edbe0 00000000`00000021 00000000`0000003e : netbt!UdpSendDatagram+0x1b1
fffff880`07c494d0 fffff880`039870e6 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000032 fffff880`039a0089 : netbt!UdpSendResponse+0x4e0
fffff880`07c49550 fffff880`0397bbe7 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : netbt!QueryFromNet+0xb11
fffff880`07c49680 fffff880`03979b47 : 00000000`00000032 fffff880`05a0c0d0 00000000`00000032 fffffa80`0409bc02 : netbt!NameSrvHndlrNotOs+0xca
fffff880`07c496c0 fffff880`0297d325 : fffffa80`06bed080 fffffa80`070f0002 fffff880`07c499c8 fffffa80`06bed080 : netbt!TdiRcvNameSrvHandler+0x367
fffff880`07c49760 fffff880`0363f395 : fffffa80`070fd840 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`070fd840 fffffa80`070fd840 : tdx!TdxEventReceiveMessagesTransportAddress+0x315
fffff880`07c49950 fffff880`0363f8a4 : fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`070fd840 00000000`00000000 fffff880`05a0c0c8 : tcpip!UdpDeliverDatagrams+0x155
fffff880`07c49ae0 fffff880`0365d727 : fffffa80`04f71e30 fffff880`00000000 fffffa80`06863460 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpReceiveDatagrams+0x324
fffff880`07c49bd0 fffff880`0365d799 : fffff880`07c49d50 fffff880`0376b9a0 fffff880`07c49d60 fffffa80`04adaf10 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0xf7
fffff880`07c49c90 fffff880`0365dc90 : fffff880`0376b9a0 fffffa80`072ef160 00000000`00000011 fffff880`07c49d50 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x59
fffff880`07c49d00 fffff880`0365cb21 : 00000000`ff01a8c0 fffffa80`04f77138 fffff880`0376b9a0 00000000`051bc501 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x231
fffff880`07c49de0 fffff880`03734542 : fffffa80`068632c0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`051bc501 fffff880`00000001 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x651
fffff880`07c49fe0 fffff880`0293bafa : fffffa80`05f86b02 fffffa80`05f86b40 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!IppInspectInjectReceive+0xf2
fffff880`07c4a020 fffff880`0381637f : fffffa80`067e9720 fffffa80`051bc5d0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : fwpkclnt!FwpsInjectTransportReceiveAsync0+0x256
fffff880`07c4a0d0 fffff880`0381559c : fffffa80`051bc5d0 fffffa80`04fbfb40 fffffa80`04595bf8 fffffa80`04595ac0 : vsdatant+0x1637f
fffff880`07c4a160 fffff880`0380eca1 : fffffa80`051bc5d0 fffffa80`051bc5d0 fffff880`07c4aa00 fffffa80`051bc6c8 : vsdatant+0x1559c
fffff880`07c4a260 fffff880`015a557f : fffff880`07c4a948 fffff880`07c4aa60 fffffa80`04da9860 fffffa80`044a8c30 : vsdatant+0xeca1
fffff880`07c4a390 fffff880`0158e619 : 00000000`00000018 fffff880`07c4a948 fffffa80`04302be8 fffffa80`04da9860 : NETIO! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x7267
fffff880`07c4a4b0 fffff880`0158fbb1 : 00000000`00000018 fffff880`07c4a948 fffff880`07c4aa60 fffff880`00000000 : NETIO!ArbitrateAndEnforce+0x2a9
fffff880`07c4a580 fffff880`036fefbb : fffff880`07c4af98 fffff880`07c4a948 fffff880`00000000 fffffa80`04da9860 : NETIO!KfdClassify+0x934
fffff880`07c4a8f0 fffff880`03602d10 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`071d3db0 fffffa80`04302cf0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WFPDatagramDataShimV4+0x49b
fffff880`07c4ac50 fffff880`0367e73d : fffff880`07c4b0a8 fffff880`0149728a fffffa80`04df5610 fffffa80`04da9860 : tcpip! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x2b43f
fffff880`07c4aec0 fffff880`0363e050 : fffffa80`071d3db0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!ProcessAleForNonTcpIn+0x1ad
fffff880`07c4afe0 fffff880`0366efe1 : fffffa80`00000011 fffffa80`070f0002 fffffa80`04f78900 00000000`00008900 : tcpip!WfpProcessInTransportStackIndication+0xb10
fffff880`07c4b350 fffff880`0363ef63 : fffffa80`070fd840 fffffa80`04e4d820 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`04f77000 : tcpip!InetInspectReceiveDatagram+0x121
fffff880`07c4b3f0 fffff880`0363f315 : fffffa80`070fd840 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff880`03674795 : tcpip!UdpBeginMessageIndication+0x83
fffff880`07c4b540 fffff880`0363f8a4 : fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`070fd840 00000000`00000000 fffff880`05a0c0c8 : tcpip!UdpDeliverDatagrams+0xd5
fffff880`07c4b6d0 fffff880`0365d727 : fffffa80`04f71e30 fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`06863460 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpReceiveDatagrams+0x324
fffff880`07c4b7c0 fffff880`0365d799 : fffff880`07c4b940 fffff880`0376b9a0 fffff880`07c4b950 fffffa80`04adaf10 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0xf7
fffff880`07c4b880 fffff880`0365dc90 : fffff880`0376b9a0 fffffa80`04c5f970 00000000`00000011 fffff880`07c4b940 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x59
fffff880`07c4b8f0 fffff880`0365cb21 : 00000000`ff01a8c0 fffffa80`04f77000 fffff880`0376b9a0 00000000`06855b01 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x231
fffff880`07c4b9d0 fffff880`0365b592 : fffffa80`068632c0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`06855b01 fffff880`00000001 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x651
fffff880`07c4bbd0 fffff880`03674e5a : fffffa80`06855bb0 fffff880`07c4bd00 fffffa80`06855bb0 fffffa80`04da0000 : tcpip!FlpReceiveNonPreValidatedNetBufferListChain+0x2b2
fffff880`07c4bcb0 fffff800`02ad1e5a : fffffa80`04da9860 fffff880`07c47000 00000000`00004800 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChainCalloutRoutine+0xda
fffff880`07c4bd00 fffff880`03674882 : fffff880`03674d80 fffff880`07c4be10 fffff880`07c4be02 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0xda
fffff880`07c4bde0 fffff880`015540eb : fffffa80`06866780 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0524a1a0 fffffa80`0524a1a0 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChain+0xb2
fffff880`07c4be50 fffff880`0151dfc6 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ndis!ndisMIndicateNetBufferListsToOpen+0xdb
fffff880`07c4bec0 fffff880`014a0a24 : fffffa80`0524a1a0 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`04cb0030 : ndis!ndisMDispatchReceiveNetBufferLists+0x1d6
fffff880`07c4c340 fffff880`014a09e9 : 00000000`00000004 fffff880`01497fbf fffffa80`06836010 fffff880`0381978b : ndis!ndisMTopReceiveNetBufferLists+0x24
fffff880`07c4c380 fffff880`014a0980 : fffff880`05a0c09e fffffa80`06836010 ffff0000`04428141 fffff880`04c06355 : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29
fffff880`07c4c3c0 fffff880`03819ba5 : fffffa80`06856010 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`04da9860 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50
fffff880`07c4c400 fffff880`014a09e9 : fffffa80`06856010 fffffa80`04da9860 fffffa80`00000000 00000000`00000001 : vsdatant+0x19ba5
fffff880`07c4c4a0 fffff880`014a0980 : fffff880`04c405c0 fffffa80`06836010 fffffa80`06850810 00000000`00000001 : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29
fffff880`07c4c4e0 fffff880`04c097ee : fffffa80`06836010 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`04da9860 fffff880`04c405c0 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50
fffff880`07c4c520 fffff880`014a09e9 : fffffa80`05b89810 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`0533c6d0 : nwifi!Pt6Receive+0x296
fffff880`07c4c580 fffff880`014a0980 : 00000000`00000001 fffff880`038ce0bc fffffa80`05b8d328 fffff880`05221198 : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29
fffff880`07c4c5c0 fffff880`038ca9c0 : fffff880`038d1110 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`05b8dd78 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50
fffff880`07c4c600 fffff880`014b82b7 : fffffa80`0524a1a0 fffffa80`04c5f840 fffffa80`04c5f840 00000000`00000001 : vwififlt!FilterReceiveNetBufferLists+0x158
fffff880`07c4c660 fffff880`0521aaa3 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`04c5f840 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000001 : ndis! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0xccef
fffff880`07c4c6b0 fffff880`053b7b07 : fffffa80`05389d60 fffffa80`06179c70 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`04c5f840 : NETw5s64+0xaaa3
STACK_COMMAND: kb
FOLLOWUP_IP:
NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a
fffff880`0158ec5a 448b442470 mov r8d,dword ptr [rsp+70h]
SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 4
SYMBOL_NAME: NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a
FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner
MODULE_NAME: NETIO
IMAGE_NAME: NETIO.SYS
DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 4bbe946f
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a
BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a
Followup: MachineOwner
3: kd> lmvm NETIO
start end module name
fffff880`01588000 fffff880`015e8000 NETIO (pdb symbols) C:\ProgramData\dbg\sym\netio.pdb\8422557063CC44C8B9525A086FA98C032\netio.pdb
Loaded symbol image file: NETIO.SYS
Image path: \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\NETIO.SYS
Image name: NETIO.SYS
Timestamp: Fri Apr 09 04:43:59 2010 (4BBE946F)
CheckSum: 0005CFA1
ImageSize: 00060000
Translations: 0000.04b0 0000.04e4 0409.04b0 0409.04e4
Die Datei, die beim Minidump als möglicher Verursacher des Fehlers aufgelistet ist, lässt sich für mich keinem konkreten Programm bzw Prozess zuordnen, kenne mich aber nicht zu gut darin aus, deßhalb wende ich mich hiermit an euch.
Die Datei, die beim Memorydump als möglicher Verursacher aufgelistet ist, könnte die von ZoneAlarm stammen?
Es wäre echt super, wenn ihr mir helfen könntet, herauszufinden, was den Fehler verursacht, und mir dann Tipps geben könntet, wie ich den Fehler beheben könnte.
MfG
Hannes
Ich poste unten sowohl den Minidump, als auch den Memorydump der letzten Bluescreen Fehlermeldung. Die Dumpdateien wurden über Windbg debuggt.
Zuerst den Minidump:
Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.12.0002.633 AMD64
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Loading Dump File [C:\Users\Hannes\Desktop\031511-27518-01.dmp]
Mini Kernel Dump File: Only registers and stack trace are available
Symbol search path is: srv*DownstreamStore*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is:
Windows 7 Kernel Version 7600 MP (4 procs) Free x64
Product: WinNt, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS Personal
Built by: 7600.16695.amd64fre.win7_gdr.101026-1503
Machine Name:
Kernel base = 0xfffff800`02a52000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0xfffff800`02c8fe50
Debug session time: Tue Mar 15 23:43:39.902 2011 (UTC + 1:00)
System Uptime: 0 days 3:27:24.073
Loading Kernel Symbols
Loading User Symbols
Loading unloaded module list
*
- *
- Bugcheck Analysis *
- *
Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information.
BugCheck 7F, {8, 80050031, 6f8, fffff80002a8aeb0}
Probably caused by : ntkrnlmp.exe ( nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+b2 )
Followup: MachineOwner
3: kd> !analyze -v
*
- *
- Bugcheck Analysis *
- *
UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP (7f)
This means a trap occurred in kernel mode, and it's a trap of a kind
that the kernel isn't allowed to have/catch (bound trap) or that
is always instant death (double fault). The first number in the
bugcheck params is the number of the trap (8 = double fault, etc)
Consult an Intel x86 family manual to learn more about what these
traps are. Here is a *portion* of those codes:
If kv shows a taskGate
use .tss on the part before the colon, then kv.
Else if kv shows a trapframe
use .trap on that value
Else
.trap on the appropriate frame will show where the trap was taken
(on x86, this will be the ebp that goes with the procedure KiTrap)
Endif
kb will then show the corrected stack.
Arguments:
Arg1: 0000000000000008, EXCEPTION_DOUBLE_FAULT
Arg2: 0000000080050031
Arg3: 00000000000006f8
Arg4: fffff80002a8aeb0
Debugging Details:
BUGCHECK_STR: 0x7f_8
CUSTOMER_CRASH_COUNT: 1
DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT
PROCESS_NAME: System
CURRENT_IRQL: 2
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from fffff80002ac1ca9 to fffff80002ac2740
STACK_TEXT:
fffff880`02bd9ce8 fffff800`02ac1ca9 : 00000000`0000007f 00000000`00000008 00000000`80050031 00000000`000006f8 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
fffff880`02bd9cf0 fffff800`02ac0172 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69
fffff880`02bd9e30 fffff800`02a8aeb0 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+0xb2
fffff880`07c46b70 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!SeAccessCheckFromState+0x58
STACK_COMMAND: kb
FOLLOWUP_IP:
nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+b2
fffff800`02ac0172 90 nop
SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 2
SYMBOL_NAME: nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+b2
FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner
MODULE_NAME: nt
IMAGE_NAME: ntkrnlmp.exe
DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 4cc791bd
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+b2
BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+b2
Followup: MachineOwner
3: kd> lmvm nt
start end module name
fffff800`02a52000 fffff800`0302f000 nt (pdb symbols) C:\ProgramData\dbg\sym\ntkrnlmp.pdb\518768F0031C4F5C9C3211628CC6C8422\ntkrnlmp.pdb
Loaded symbol image file: ntkrnlmp.exe
Mapped memory image file: C:\ProgramData\dbg\sym\ntoskrnl.exe\4CC791BD5dd000\ntoskrnl.exe
Image path: ntkrnlmp.exe
Image name: ntkrnlmp.exe
Timestamp: Wed Oct 27 04:43:09 2010 (4CC791BD)
CheckSum: 00550986
ImageSize: 005DD000
File version: 6.1.7600.16695
Product version: 6.1.7600.16695
File flags: 0 (Mask 3F)
File OS: 40004 NT Win32
File type: 1.0 App
File date: 00000000.00000000
Translations: 0409.04b0
CompanyName: Microsoft Corporation
ProductName: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
InternalName: ntkrnlmp.exe
OriginalFilename: ntkrnlmp.exe
ProductVersion: 6.1.7600.16695
FileVersion: 6.1.7600.16695 (win7_gdr.101026-1503)
FileDescription: NT Kernel & System
LegalCopyright: © Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Nun der Memorydump:
Loading Dump File [C:\Users\Hannes\Desktop\MEMORY.DMP]
Kernel Summary Dump File: Only kernel address space is available
Symbol search path is: srv*DownstreamStore*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is:
Windows 7 Kernel Version 7600 MP (4 procs) Free x64
Product: WinNt, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS Personal
Built by: 7600.16695.amd64fre.win7_gdr.101026-1503
Machine Name:
Kernel base = 0xfffff800`02a52000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0xfffff800`02c8fe50
Debug session time: Tue Mar 15 23:43:39.902 2011 (UTC + 1:00)
System Uptime: 0 days 3:27:24.073
Loading Kernel Symbols
Loading User Symbols
Loading unloaded module list
*
- *
- Bugcheck Analysis *
- *
Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information.
BugCheck 7F, {8, 80050031, 6f8, fffff80002a8aeb0}
* ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for vsdatant.sys
* ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for NETw5s64.sys
Probably caused by : NETIO.SYS ( NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a )
Followup: MachineOwner
3: kd> !analyze -v
*
- *
- Bugcheck Analysis *
- *
UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP (7f)
This means a trap occurred in kernel mode, and it's a trap of a kind
that the kernel isn't allowed to have/catch (bound trap) or that
is always instant death (double fault). The first number in the
bugcheck params is the number of the trap (8 = double fault, etc)
Consult an Intel x86 family manual to learn more about what these
traps are. Here is a *portion* of those codes:
If kv shows a taskGate
use .tss on the part before the colon, then kv.
Else if kv shows a trapframe
use .trap on that value
Else
.trap on the appropriate frame will show where the trap was taken
(on x86, this will be the ebp that goes with the procedure KiTrap)
Endif
kb will then show the corrected stack.
Arguments:
Arg1: 0000000000000008, EXCEPTION_DOUBLE_FAULT
Arg2: 0000000080050031
Arg3: 00000000000006f8
Arg4: fffff80002a8aeb0
Debugging Details:
BUGCHECK_STR: 0x7f_8
DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT
PROCESS_NAME: System
CURRENT_IRQL: 2
LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from fffff80002ac1ca9 to fffff80002ac2740
STACK_TEXT:
fffff880`02bd9ce8 fffff800`02ac1ca9 : 00000000`0000007f 00000000`00000008 00000000`80050031 00000000`000006f8 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
fffff880`02bd9cf0 fffff800`02ac0172 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69
fffff880`02bd9e30 fffff800`02a8aeb0 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+0xb2
fffff880`07c46b70 fffff880`0158ec5a : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!SeAccessCheckFromState+0x58
fffff880`07c47260 fffff880`0158c94f : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+0x6a
fffff880`07c472d0 fffff880`0158e9b5 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : NETIO!MatchValues+0xef
fffff880`07c47320 fffff880`0158e845 : fffffa80`06d3ac30 fffffa80`04b8e9c0 fffff880`07c47548 fffff880`07c47c80 : NETIO!FilterMatch+0x95
fffff880`07c47370 fffff880`0158fccb : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff880`07c47c80 fffff880`07c47530 : NETIO!IndexListClassify+0x69
fffff880`07c473f0 fffff880`0363d417 : fffff880`07c478c8 fffff880`07c478c8 fffff880`07c48600 fffffa80`07f3e610 : NETIO!KfdClassify+0xa4e
fffff880`07c47760 fffff880`0363683e : fffff880`03745690 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`071d3db0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleClassify+0x57
fffff880`07c477a0 fffff880`03635cd5 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAlepAuthorizeSend+0x94e
fffff880`07c47eb0 fffff880`03639886 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000011 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleAuthorizeSend+0x325
fffff880`07c48180 fffff880`0363c5e4 : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`07c485b8 fffff880`07c485c0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleConnectAcceptIndicate+0x106
fffff880`07c48270 fffff880`03635019 : 00000000`0e8f5437 fffff880`03812f2b 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000008 : tcpip!ProcessALEForTransportPacket+0x664
fffff880`07c484e0 fffff880`03663ef6 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`00000002 fffffa80`047f8900 fffffa80`071c8900 : tcpip!WfpProcessOutTransportStackIndication+0x329
fffff880`07c486b0 fffff880`036691ee : fffffa80`047f6080 fffff880`0158a804 fffff880`0376b9a0 fffffa80`071d3db0 : tcpip!IppSendDatagramsCommon+0x526
fffff880`07c48980 fffff880`03633db8 : fffffa80`071d3db0 fffffa80`07f3e610 fffffa80`07f3e610 fffffa80`047f6080 : tcpip!IpNlpSendDatagrams+0x3e
fffff880`07c489c0 fffff880`0363432d : fffffa80`06e64280 fffffa80`06ea6200 fffff880`07c49310 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpSendMessagesOnPathCreation+0x688
fffff880`07c48d40 fffff880`03633fb5 : fffff880`07c49270 fffffa80`072e8900 fffff880`00000001 fffffa80`05eee080 : tcpip!UdpSendMessages+0x35d
fffff880`07c49130 fffff800`02ad1e5a : fffff880`07c494c0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpTlProviderSendMessagesCalloutRoutine+0x15
fffff880`07c49160 fffff880`03634578 : fffff880`03633fa0 fffff880`07c49270 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0xda
fffff880`07c49240 fffff880`0297ef45 : fffffa80`04e051c0 fffffa80`0427bc10 fffffa80`0409bcd0 fffffa80`070eddce : tcpip!UdpTlProviderSendMessages+0x78
fffff880`07c492c0 fffff880`0297eff2 : fffffa80`04e8d902 fffffa80`06228140 fffffa80`03ead770 fffffa80`06228140 : tdx!TdxSendDatagramTransportAddress+0x2f5
fffff880`07c493a0 fffff880`0397a542 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`03df9f20 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`03ead610 : tdx!TdxTdiDispatchInternalDeviceControl+0x52
fffff880`07c493d0 fffff880`0397af61 : fffffa80`070edd98 fffffa80`070edd98 fffffa80`0718c4e0 fffff880`07c494d0 : netbt!TdiSendDatagram+0x187
fffff880`07c49440 fffff880`03987329 : fffffa80`0402af50 fffffa80`070edbe0 00000000`00000021 00000000`0000003e : netbt!UdpSendDatagram+0x1b1
fffff880`07c494d0 fffff880`039870e6 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000032 fffff880`039a0089 : netbt!UdpSendResponse+0x4e0
fffff880`07c49550 fffff880`0397bbe7 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : netbt!QueryFromNet+0xb11
fffff880`07c49680 fffff880`03979b47 : 00000000`00000032 fffff880`05a0c0d0 00000000`00000032 fffffa80`0409bc02 : netbt!NameSrvHndlrNotOs+0xca
fffff880`07c496c0 fffff880`0297d325 : fffffa80`06bed080 fffffa80`070f0002 fffff880`07c499c8 fffffa80`06bed080 : netbt!TdiRcvNameSrvHandler+0x367
fffff880`07c49760 fffff880`0363f395 : fffffa80`070fd840 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`070fd840 fffffa80`070fd840 : tdx!TdxEventReceiveMessagesTransportAddress+0x315
fffff880`07c49950 fffff880`0363f8a4 : fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`070fd840 00000000`00000000 fffff880`05a0c0c8 : tcpip!UdpDeliverDatagrams+0x155
fffff880`07c49ae0 fffff880`0365d727 : fffffa80`04f71e30 fffff880`00000000 fffffa80`06863460 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpReceiveDatagrams+0x324
fffff880`07c49bd0 fffff880`0365d799 : fffff880`07c49d50 fffff880`0376b9a0 fffff880`07c49d60 fffffa80`04adaf10 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0xf7
fffff880`07c49c90 fffff880`0365dc90 : fffff880`0376b9a0 fffffa80`072ef160 00000000`00000011 fffff880`07c49d50 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x59
fffff880`07c49d00 fffff880`0365cb21 : 00000000`ff01a8c0 fffffa80`04f77138 fffff880`0376b9a0 00000000`051bc501 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x231
fffff880`07c49de0 fffff880`03734542 : fffffa80`068632c0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`051bc501 fffff880`00000001 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x651
fffff880`07c49fe0 fffff880`0293bafa : fffffa80`05f86b02 fffffa80`05f86b40 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!IppInspectInjectReceive+0xf2
fffff880`07c4a020 fffff880`0381637f : fffffa80`067e9720 fffffa80`051bc5d0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : fwpkclnt!FwpsInjectTransportReceiveAsync0+0x256
fffff880`07c4a0d0 fffff880`0381559c : fffffa80`051bc5d0 fffffa80`04fbfb40 fffffa80`04595bf8 fffffa80`04595ac0 : vsdatant+0x1637f
fffff880`07c4a160 fffff880`0380eca1 : fffffa80`051bc5d0 fffffa80`051bc5d0 fffff880`07c4aa00 fffffa80`051bc6c8 : vsdatant+0x1559c
fffff880`07c4a260 fffff880`015a557f : fffff880`07c4a948 fffff880`07c4aa60 fffffa80`04da9860 fffffa80`044a8c30 : vsdatant+0xeca1
fffff880`07c4a390 fffff880`0158e619 : 00000000`00000018 fffff880`07c4a948 fffffa80`04302be8 fffffa80`04da9860 : NETIO! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x7267
fffff880`07c4a4b0 fffff880`0158fbb1 : 00000000`00000018 fffff880`07c4a948 fffff880`07c4aa60 fffff880`00000000 : NETIO!ArbitrateAndEnforce+0x2a9
fffff880`07c4a580 fffff880`036fefbb : fffff880`07c4af98 fffff880`07c4a948 fffff880`00000000 fffffa80`04da9860 : NETIO!KfdClassify+0x934
fffff880`07c4a8f0 fffff880`03602d10 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`071d3db0 fffffa80`04302cf0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WFPDatagramDataShimV4+0x49b
fffff880`07c4ac50 fffff880`0367e73d : fffff880`07c4b0a8 fffff880`0149728a fffffa80`04df5610 fffffa80`04da9860 : tcpip! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x2b43f
fffff880`07c4aec0 fffff880`0363e050 : fffffa80`071d3db0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!ProcessAleForNonTcpIn+0x1ad
fffff880`07c4afe0 fffff880`0366efe1 : fffffa80`00000011 fffffa80`070f0002 fffffa80`04f78900 00000000`00008900 : tcpip!WfpProcessInTransportStackIndication+0xb10
fffff880`07c4b350 fffff880`0363ef63 : fffffa80`070fd840 fffffa80`04e4d820 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`04f77000 : tcpip!InetInspectReceiveDatagram+0x121
fffff880`07c4b3f0 fffff880`0363f315 : fffffa80`070fd840 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff880`03674795 : tcpip!UdpBeginMessageIndication+0x83
fffff880`07c4b540 fffff880`0363f8a4 : fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`070fd840 00000000`00000000 fffff880`05a0c0c8 : tcpip!UdpDeliverDatagrams+0xd5
fffff880`07c4b6d0 fffff880`0365d727 : fffffa80`04f71e30 fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`06863460 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!UdpReceiveDatagrams+0x324
fffff880`07c4b7c0 fffff880`0365d799 : fffff880`07c4b940 fffff880`0376b9a0 fffff880`07c4b950 fffffa80`04adaf10 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0xf7
fffff880`07c4b880 fffff880`0365dc90 : fffff880`0376b9a0 fffffa80`04c5f970 00000000`00000011 fffff880`07c4b940 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x59
fffff880`07c4b8f0 fffff880`0365cb21 : 00000000`ff01a8c0 fffffa80`04f77000 fffff880`0376b9a0 00000000`06855b01 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x231
fffff880`07c4b9d0 fffff880`0365b592 : fffffa80`068632c0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`06855b01 fffff880`00000001 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x651
fffff880`07c4bbd0 fffff880`03674e5a : fffffa80`06855bb0 fffff880`07c4bd00 fffffa80`06855bb0 fffffa80`04da0000 : tcpip!FlpReceiveNonPreValidatedNetBufferListChain+0x2b2
fffff880`07c4bcb0 fffff800`02ad1e5a : fffffa80`04da9860 fffff880`07c47000 00000000`00004800 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChainCalloutRoutine+0xda
fffff880`07c4bd00 fffff880`03674882 : fffff880`03674d80 fffff880`07c4be10 fffff880`07c4be02 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0xda
fffff880`07c4bde0 fffff880`015540eb : fffffa80`06866780 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0524a1a0 fffffa80`0524a1a0 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChain+0xb2
fffff880`07c4be50 fffff880`0151dfc6 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ndis!ndisMIndicateNetBufferListsToOpen+0xdb
fffff880`07c4bec0 fffff880`014a0a24 : fffffa80`0524a1a0 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`04cb0030 : ndis!ndisMDispatchReceiveNetBufferLists+0x1d6
fffff880`07c4c340 fffff880`014a09e9 : 00000000`00000004 fffff880`01497fbf fffffa80`06836010 fffff880`0381978b : ndis!ndisMTopReceiveNetBufferLists+0x24
fffff880`07c4c380 fffff880`014a0980 : fffff880`05a0c09e fffffa80`06836010 ffff0000`04428141 fffff880`04c06355 : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29
fffff880`07c4c3c0 fffff880`03819ba5 : fffffa80`06856010 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`04da9860 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50
fffff880`07c4c400 fffff880`014a09e9 : fffffa80`06856010 fffffa80`04da9860 fffffa80`00000000 00000000`00000001 : vsdatant+0x19ba5
fffff880`07c4c4a0 fffff880`014a0980 : fffff880`04c405c0 fffffa80`06836010 fffffa80`06850810 00000000`00000001 : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29
fffff880`07c4c4e0 fffff880`04c097ee : fffffa80`06836010 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`04da9860 fffff880`04c405c0 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50
fffff880`07c4c520 fffff880`014a09e9 : fffffa80`05b89810 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`0533c6d0 : nwifi!Pt6Receive+0x296
fffff880`07c4c580 fffff880`014a0980 : 00000000`00000001 fffff880`038ce0bc fffffa80`05b8d328 fffff880`05221198 : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29
fffff880`07c4c5c0 fffff880`038ca9c0 : fffff880`038d1110 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`05b8dd78 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50
fffff880`07c4c600 fffff880`014b82b7 : fffffa80`0524a1a0 fffffa80`04c5f840 fffffa80`04c5f840 00000000`00000001 : vwififlt!FilterReceiveNetBufferLists+0x158
fffff880`07c4c660 fffff880`0521aaa3 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`04c5f840 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000001 : ndis! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0xccef
fffff880`07c4c6b0 fffff880`053b7b07 : fffffa80`05389d60 fffffa80`06179c70 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`04c5f840 : NETw5s64+0xaaa3
STACK_COMMAND: kb
FOLLOWUP_IP:
NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a
fffff880`0158ec5a 448b442470 mov r8d,dword ptr [rsp+70h]
SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 4
SYMBOL_NAME: NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a
FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner
MODULE_NAME: NETIO
IMAGE_NAME: NETIO.SYS
DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 4bbe946f
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a
BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a
Followup: MachineOwner
3: kd> lmvm NETIO
start end module name
fffff880`01588000 fffff880`015e8000 NETIO (pdb symbols) C:\ProgramData\dbg\sym\netio.pdb\8422557063CC44C8B9525A086FA98C032\netio.pdb
Loaded symbol image file: NETIO.SYS
Image path: \SystemRoot\system32\drivers\NETIO.SYS
Image name: NETIO.SYS
Timestamp: Fri Apr 09 04:43:59 2010 (4BBE946F)
CheckSum: 0005CFA1
ImageSize: 00060000
Translations: 0000.04b0 0000.04e4 0409.04b0 0409.04e4
Die Datei, die beim Minidump als möglicher Verursacher des Fehlers aufgelistet ist, lässt sich für mich keinem konkreten Programm bzw Prozess zuordnen, kenne mich aber nicht zu gut darin aus, deßhalb wende ich mich hiermit an euch.
Die Datei, die beim Memorydump als möglicher Verursacher aufgelistet ist, könnte die von ZoneAlarm stammen?
Es wäre echt super, wenn ihr mir helfen könntet, herauszufinden, was den Fehler verursacht, und mir dann Tipps geben könntet, wie ich den Fehler beheben könnte.
MfG
Hannes
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Content-Key: 162770
Url: https://administrator.de/contentid/162770
Printed on: April 18, 2024 at 06:04 o'clock
7 Comments
Latest comment
Hi,
also wenn du die ntkrnlmp.exe meinst, dann hätte das Eintippen bei Goole direkt geholfen!
Hier der Link
Oder das Google Ergebnis
Lg GRapper
also wenn du die ntkrnlmp.exe meinst, dann hätte das Eintippen bei Goole direkt geholfen!
Hier der Link
Oder das Google Ergebnis
Lg GRapper
Für ZoneAlarm hatte ich die NETIO.sys gemeint.
Was ich vllt noch vergessen habe zu schreiben:
Ich habe schon sowohl eine Dell PSA Diagnose ohne befund durchlaufen lassen, als auch über das Bootmenü eine Diagnose, welche auch keinen Fehler zeigte.
Was ich vllt noch vergessen habe zu schreiben:
Ich habe schon sowohl eine Dell PSA Diagnose ohne befund durchlaufen lassen, als auch über das Bootmenü eine Diagnose, welche auch keinen Fehler zeigte.
Die NETIO.SYS ist eine Treiberdatei der Netzwerkkarte,
allerdings kann es gut sein,
dass ZoneAlarm da nicht ganz parat kommt.
Ich würde jetzt erst einmal:
Lg Grapper
allerdings kann es gut sein,
dass ZoneAlarm da nicht ganz parat kommt.
Ich würde jetzt erst einmal:
- Zone Alarm DEINSTALLIEREN
- Testen ob der Bluescreen nochmal kommt.
- Wenn Problem weiterhin besteht Netzwerkkarten Treiber DEINSTALLIEREN (von LAN UND W-LAN)
- Nochmal testen ob der Bluescreen erscheint.
- Wenn immernoch vorhanden (Memory Test mit MemTest)
- Wenn du dann immernoch Probleme haben solltest, dann wären weitere Informationen günstig. Wie z.B. **Ist Software neu Installiert worden, Updates Installiert, Hardware ein oder ausgebaut?.....)
Lg Grapper
Hi,
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;Q137539
Daher bitte einmal Arbeitsspeicher und Festplatte auf Fehler überprüfen. Ein entsprechenes Tool für die Festplatte findest du beim Hersteller der Festplatte, für den Arbeitsspeicher Memtest86+: http://www.memtest.org/#downiso
Gruß Orlean
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;Q137539
Your computer has hardware or software problems (hardware failure is the most common cause).
Daher bitte einmal Arbeitsspeicher und Festplatte auf Fehler überprüfen. Ein entsprechenes Tool für die Festplatte findest du beim Hersteller der Festplatte, für den Arbeitsspeicher Memtest86+: http://www.memtest.org/#downiso
Gruß Orlean
Ok. Danke.
Ich werde dann mal MemTest durchlaufen lassen. Treiber habe ich auch noch alle ausstehenden Aktualisiert. Waren aber nur 2, und die sind für Wi-Fi gewesen. Aber der Wi-Fi Contoller ist bei mi deaktiviert. Könnte das trötzdem mit reingefunkt haben?
Ich werde dann mal MemTest durchlaufen lassen. Treiber habe ich auch noch alle ausstehenden Aktualisiert. Waren aber nur 2, und die sind für Wi-Fi gewesen. Aber der Wi-Fi Contoller ist bei mi deaktiviert. Könnte das trötzdem mit reingefunkt haben?
Wenn der Treiber installiert ist und beim Start mit aufgerufen wird, dann kann dies natürlich schon
das Problem sein. Ich würde dann einfach mal den WiFi Treiber Deinstallieren,
da er ja anscheinend gar nicht benötigt wird.
Wenn Deinstalliert, dann würde ich auch die Karte ausbauen (abklemmen) jenachdem,
wie der Aufbau der boardes ist.
Dann bekommst du auch keine Meldungen alla "Neue Hardware Gefunden"....
Lg Grapper
das Problem sein. Ich würde dann einfach mal den WiFi Treiber Deinstallieren,
da er ja anscheinend gar nicht benötigt wird.
Wenn Deinstalliert, dann würde ich auch die Karte ausbauen (abklemmen) jenachdem,
wie der Aufbau der boardes ist.
Dann bekommst du auch keine Meldungen alla "Neue Hardware Gefunden"....
Lg Grapper
Das ist natürlich die beste lösung. Werde die Treiber dann deinstallieren. dann sollte das keine Probleme mehr geben.
Danke nochmal für die schnelle Hilfe
MfG
Danke nochmal für die schnelle Hilfe
MfG
